您当前位置: 首 页 / 2026 / 02 / 正文

企业碳排放监管的多主体动态演化博弈研究

来源: 发布时间:2026/08/30 09:40:07 浏览人数:

企业碳排放监管的多主体动态演化博弈研究

基金项目(Foundation): 福建省自然科学基金计划项目“福建省数字金融赋能企业高质量出口:基于面板门槛模型的非线性效应研究”(2024J01988); 福建商学院校级项目“金融资源错配对民营企业出口竞争力的影响研究”(2023sysk10)
邮箱(Email):
DOI: 10.19473/j.cnki.1008-4940.2026.02.013
发布时间: 2026-04-20
出版时间: 2026-04-20

摘要:

构建动态演化博弈模型,分析在碳市场交易中政府、控排企业和第三方核查机构的行为选择和演化博弈过程。结果发现:控排企业的诚信行为能够产生超越外部监管的系统治理效应,在特定收益结构下,即使面临核查失实与监管缺位,控排企业选择真实披露数据的行为本身,即可有效抑制合谋空间;第三方核查机构的“双重代理”角色冲突是引发碳排放核查数据失真的结构性根源,当核查机构的经济来源依赖于被核查对象时,第三方碳核查机构在合谋收益的诱惑下,会陷入“企业造假-虚假核查”的稳定共谋均衡;单一的奖惩策略无法解决所有环节的激励扭曲,即使政府的严格监管有效遏制了企业造假,但若核查市场恶性竞争等原因,使得合规核查的成本收益严重失衡,第三方机构仍会倾向于采取“形式化”的虚假核查。因此要通过构建多维激励与市场约束机制、推动核查服务采购与付费机制改革、完善双轨制定价等引导碳核查市场健康发展。

Abstract:

This study constructed a dynamic evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral choices and evolutionary game processes among governments,emission-controlled enterprises,and third-party verification agencies in carbon market transactions.The results showed that the honest behavior of emission-controlled enterprises could produce a systematic governance effect beyond external supervision.Under a specific revenue structure,even in the presence of inaccurate verification and absent supervision,the choice of emission-controlled enterprises to disclose data truthfully could effectively reduce the room for collusion.The conflict arising from the "dual-agent" role of third-party verification agencies constituted the structural root of data distortion in carbon emission verification.When the financial resources of verification agencies depended on the entities being verified,third-party carbon verification agencies would be tempted by collusion benefits and fall into a stable collusive equilibrium of "enterprise fraud-false verification".A single reward and punishment strategy failed to address incentive distortions across all links.Even if strict government supervision effectively curbed enterprise fraud,third-party agencies would still tend to conduct formalized false verification if the cost-benefit balance of compliant verification was seriously disrupted due to factors such as vicious competition in the verification market.Policy recommendations were proposed to guide the healthy development of the carbon verification market,including establishing a multi-dimensional incentive and market constraint mechanism,promoting the reform of verification service procurement and payment mechanism,and improving the dual-track pricing mechanism.


上一篇: 数字贸易、产业结构升级与劳动收入份额
下一篇: 数据要素对企业双元技术创新的影响研究——来自福建新能源制造上市企业的经验证据